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Abstract—The paper discusses the threats to networks of
resource-limited things such as wireless sensors and the dif-
ferent mechanisms used to deal with them. A novel approach
to threat detection is proposed. MOTHON is a movement-
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1. Introduction
The terms like computer or network are becoming less clear
as the technology advances. No more than ten years ago,
most of the nodes in the Internet were stationary computers
with a wired connection. On the server side of the network
this is still an accurate depiction at least of the physical
setup, although admittedly more and more inaccurate on the
logical side, as virtualization advances and the additional
cloud layer isolates the servers from their hardware.
On the client side, the network changed completely. Most
of new devices are wireless. Also, the name “device” is
quite appropriate, as more and more of them do not look
like traditional computers (even if that’s what they essen-
tially are). The trend is not only directed at mobility of
computing, as in case of laptops, smartphones, tablets,
etc., but also towards expanding the computational abili-
ties of other things, leading to ideas such as smart home or
smart city.
The side effect of this approach is that the network is be-
coming full of devices with at least one of the following
limitations: battery power, meaning that energy conserva-
tion becomes crucial factor, or limited computing power,
due to lowering costs, lowering energy consumption or pre-
venting heating. These limitations, the fact that many of
the devices (especially smart things) are designed by com-
panies with little experience in computing and the thing
status, meaning that users are unlikely to participate in in-
stallation of updates (so either the things will never be up-
dated or will have a fully automated update mechanism,
creating a tempting target for attacks) lead to a rather dif-
ficult situation from the security standpoint. While most
of the things are seen as not worth attacking, the situation
becomes worse when the entire heterogeneous network is
seen as a single system. Unsafe devices are points of entry
to the network, threatening other resources. They can also
be used in orchestrated attacks, e.g. providing multiple con-
sistent but false data streams leading to wrong decisions.
With diminishing isolation, security of things becomes
crucial.
The paper focuses on the client side of such a heteroge-
neous network – the (logically) local network of things,
using multi-hop ad-hoc connections if transmission range
is too short. The energy and power limitations, specialized
hardware, wireless communication and minimal manual
configuration characterizing most of smart things are also
typical in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), making them
a proto-example of a network of things. Many of the re-
sults of research in WSNs security are therefore almost
directly applicable to other devices. The main difference
is that a single WSN is usually rather homogeneous, while
in case of the Internet of Things (IoT) the devices may be
completely different in both hardware and software.
Detection of compromised nodes is most complicated in
this resource- and energy-limited part of the heterogeneous
network, where the extra load introduced by the detection
mechanisms becomes too large. The tradeoff between hav-
ing an insecure network or expending energy and resources
on protective measures could be eliminated by introducing
more powerful nodes dealing with this task. Unfortunately,
providing sufficient network coverage would require many
such nodes, effectively multiplying the system cost beyond
sensible limits.
In this paper a workaround limiting the cost of detection
nodes is proposed by allowing each detector to monitor
multiple locations through mobility.
The paper starts with a discussion of major threats classes
to such networks of small devices in Section 2. Section 3
provides an overview of the approaches toward securing
such networks. Section 4 presents authors idea of a mo-
bile intrusion detection system (IDS). A short conclusion
is given in Section 5.
2. Threats to the Network
There are many possible modes of attack against a sensor-
like network of things [1]–[3]. In general, they can be
grouped depending on several factors, such as the activity
of the attacker (active or passive), computing power (sensor
class or laptop class), location (logically inside or outside
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the network), target layer and attack goals (communication
obstruction, data capture, modification or data fabrication).
Attacks in physical layer are hard to prevent, as neither
the electromagnetic medium nor the sensors themselves are
(usually) physically protected. Active jamming attacks are
therefore effective, although rather easy to detect. Passive
sniffing is effective unless encryption is used. Physical at-
tacks on nodes are possible even without any tools (destruc-
tion or theft of nodes). More advanced physical attacks are
dangerous to the network as a whole, because of the virtu-
ally unlimited possibility of tampering with the hardware
and programming (e.g. using JTAG interface).
Attacks on the data layer are more limited, usually focusing
on flooding the medium with messages, or using standard
violations such as long frames to cause collisions.
Attacks in the network layer are potentially very effective,
but made more difficult by the fact that routing in such
networks is not part of the standard and may be done us-
ing a variety of algorithms. Attacks in this layer usually
focus on affecting the routing decisions in order to either
obstruct communication as such, or to maximize the effec-
tiveness of the limited number of malicious nodes in the
network. In the first case, providing false information in
the path building phase or sending many unnecessary path
queries are simple and quite effective sensor-class attacks,
causing additional unnecessary communication and com-
putation by network nodes, draining batteries. The second
group of attacks uses advertising great connection quality
(or other methods) in order to direct as much of the net-
work’s traffic as possible through a malicious node. Then,
after routing is established, the node can be used to monitor
the traffic (sniffing) or obstruct it, either by blackholing the
communication or by selective forwarding increasing loss
frequency.
Finally, attacks in the higher layers (transport – applica-
tion) are also possible and potentially most useful in case
of targeted attacks. The range of possibilities is too wide
to describe here. As simple examples consider attacks on
time synchronization algorithms, node location or key dis-
tribution. An attack in this layer, conducted with a deep
understanding of the goals and implementation of the net-
work, can turn the network into an extremely dangerous
misinformation tool.
3. Security Measures
Due to the limited computing power of nodes and their
need to conserve energy, any security measure that requires
a lot of computing activity on part of the network nodes
is a mixed blessing. Another problem is the broadcast-
based, self-organizing dynamic nature of such networks –
even if not mobile, they must reorganize to allow for node
malfunctions, etc. There are no natural policy enforcement
points apart from the base station – any node in the network
may be routed around. These problems result in a reduced
choice of security solutions for networks of things.
3.1. Intrusion Prevention
The first layer of defense is provided by protection mea-
sures aimed at preventing successful penetration. In case of
wireless networks of resource-limited devices this layer is
unfortunately not as strong as in wired computer networks.
Since the medium is freely accessible, the prevention must
be applied at every point in the network. However, ap-
plication of advanced mechanisms is made difficult by the
limited computing resources and the need to preserve en-
ergy. Still, some steps have been made towards provision
of important information security protections.
Proper application of cryptographic techniques can provide
privacy, authentication and data integrity. Unfortunately,
software implementations require a lot of operations, low-
ering battery life. Hardware support reduces this impact
and is available in radio modules implementing the IEEE
802.15.4 standard [4]. An unfortunate limitation of this so-
lution is the use of a single symmetric key. A lot of work to-
wards introducing cryptographic protections to higher lay-
ers and enabling efficient and secure key distribution has
been performed in recent years, including e.g. TinySec [5],
MiniSec [6], ContikiSec [7], ZigBee, LEAP/LEAP+ [8].
Another protective measure, most effective not in preven-
tion of attacks, but in network protection against already
malicious nodes, is trust management [9]. Due to limited
memory in network nodes the most practical approach is
reputation based. An example of its application to sensor
networks can be found in [10].
3.2. Intrusion Detection
Once a successful attack has been performed, the network
might be operating with one or more malicious nodes. This
constant threat to information security is often more danger-
ous than the initial attack. Detection of misbehaving nodes
allows proper mitigation techniques to be applied, including
blacklisting the node and routing around it or even phys-
ically removing it from the network (if possible). Many
methods have been proposed to detect malicious nodes.
Most of them have a common problem – secure delivery
of detection information to the base station or secure prop-
agation of information between non-malicious nodes. If
a single malicious node is detected, it might not be the only
one. If another one is in path of the warning message, it
can easily render the detection system powerless. Therefore
IDS alerts require either a separate secondary channel for
propagation, or effective protection if the primary channel
is used (separate path, encryption, etc).
The simplest form of detection of malicious behavior is the
watchdog mechanism [11], using the shared medium aspect
of wireless networks. The node sending a message can
monitor the medium to verify whether the receiving node
forwarded it correctly. There are many variations to this
mechanism in the literature. A different, more sophisticated
approach is using more advanced, rule-based intrusion de-
tection systems [12], capable of detecting many different
kinds of attacks. Both approaches require modification of
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all or selected nodes. A standard watchdog mechanism
only detects malfunctioning neighbors, so it must be active
in most of the nodes to cover the entire network. An IDS
may be somewhat effective even if only implemented at the
base station, but delivers less information.
One more approach, often used in classical networks, is
a server honeypot – a service existing only as a target for
attacks. This approach might be applicable to WSNs by
emulating a node on a more powerful device, waiting for
messages modifying its state in illegal ways. This detec-
tion method would be effective against previously unknown
types of attacks as long as the identity of the honeypot node
remains secret.
All of the previously described approaches are generally
passive – they either base detection on received traffic only
or (in case of the server honeypot) respond to messages,
but never initiate communication as part of the detection
activity. An active alternative is a client honeypot – a node,
which sends messages in order to verify whether they are
properly forwarded to the base station or other target. The
actual detection is performed at the receiving node, where
any changes to the message or variation from the normal
loss rate can be easily identified. The mechanism requires
that both the sender and the receiver agree on the nature of
the testing message or sequence of messages. This can be
done through predefinition or by using a secondary chan-
nel for transmission of this information. Note that prede-
fined messages are easier to learn and avoid at malicious
nodes.
4. Movement-assisted Threat Monitoring
in WSN
Taking into account limited resources of sensors, collec-
tion and analysis of data concerned with network security
are usually performed in a periodic manner and carried
out by selected devices implementing threat monitoring ca-
pabilities. However, in general, it is possible to extend
the functionality of all nodes and to implement permanent
monitoring. Regardless of the selected monitoring scheme,
a common objective of all security systems is establishing
a safe and reliable communication channel for exchanging
security information i.e. reporting, alerting, control traffic,
etc. between nodes. Therefore the communication can be
organized in several ways:
• by utilizing the transmission channels already set up
to propagate data in the system,
• by creating channels using disjoint logical connec-
tions within existing networks,
• by adding extra nodes to create a separate sensor
network which shares the same transmission medium,
• by equipping sensor nodes with additional hardware
modules (Wi-Fi, GSM, etc.) that can be used to
establish an additional communication channel.
Finally, threat monitoring can be successfully supported by
controlled geographic migration of sensors that have loco-
motion. A mobility of sensors is leveraged recently for
many WSN applications. Using mobile platforms to assist
sensor placement in a working space can significantly en-
hance the capability to monitor the data and detect attacks.
4.1. MOTHON System Overview
The authors have proposed a novel approach to threat mon-
itoring in WSN. In presented threat detection system one or
several mobile sensors implementing threat detection func-
tionality are forced to move to desired directions. As it is
presented in Fig. 1, due to the ability to change the location
of a sensor node, information about security events can be
passed directly to the network sink (IIIa – after completion
of all tasks, IIIb – after threat detection) or indirectly via
other nodes from another area of the monitored network.
II
I IIIa
IIIb
mobile sensor sensor sink data synchronization
route threat detection, route modification
Fig. 1. The concept of movement-assisted threat monitoring: I –
task order phase, II – performing actions phase, III – reporting
phase (a – after completion of all tasks, b – after threat detection).
The MOTHON (MObile THreat mONitoring for WSN)
system implements the concept depicted in Fig. 1. It is
composed of three components: a mobile platform (MP),
threat monitoring sensor (TMS) and management station
(MS) responsible for controlling of MP and TMSs (see
Fig. 2). It is assumed that the mobile platform can carry
one or several TMS sensors. All these sensors can be
placed in any locations in a workspace.
The MOTHON operates in three stages. The management
station initiates the first stage. The aim of the this stage
is to synchronize and gather data about a given network
(topology, characteristics of nodes, etc.) and define moni-
toring mode and plan. Passive and active modes of threat
detection are considered. Next, all data related to deci-
sions done by MS are transferred to a MP and TMS sensor
(or sensors) dedicated to threat monitoring, and the system
switches to the second stage.
Threat monitoring sensor is carried to the desired destina-
tion by mobile platform (MP). After placing at the tar-
get location TMS starts to perform assigned tasks con-
cerning the threats detection. The third stage relates to
re-synchronization of information between TMS and MS
which can occur in two cases – after completion of all
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USB
USB
USB
USB
TelosB
TMSs
Raspberry PI RJ45
RJ45
Lego Mindstorms NTX 2.0
Management
application [APP]
Mobile platform [MP]
Management station [MS]
(PC/laptop)
Fig. 2. MOTHON prototype architecture.
tasks or after threat detection. TMS transfers collected in-
formation, e.g. detected threats, additional statistics about
traversed route, etc. to MS. It can be implemented in two
ways:
• all data gathered by TMS are stored in MP, which
transfers this data to MS directly – just after threat
detection or after completion of all tasks,
• using existing communication channel via other
nodes from another area of the monitored network.
In both cases MP can leave the TMS (with default network
software) to avoid the occurrence of “temporary” nodes
in the system. Moreover one mobile platform can carry
multiple TMS sensors and place them in different locations
in workspace.
4.2. Detection Methods
MOTHON can employ either active or passive methods for
threat detection. Data analyses can be carried out either
on-line by the TMS and mobile platform, or post factum
by the mobile platform and management station.
Passive methods, which are based on analysis of informa-
tion received from neighbors (IDS) or data sniffed from
a shared medium (watchdog IDS), can keep a copy of the
observed traffic for further analysis. This is not effective
approach in case of threat monitoring with static nodes, but
can be very valuable in case of mobile platform returning
to sink from time to time. Moreover, simultaneous moni-
toring of the communication channel from several locations
in the workspace can ease analysis by allowing detection
of hidden and exposed nodes problems.
In contrast to passive methods, active solutions are not lim-
ited only to verification of individual sensor actions (cor-
rect operation of protocols, transmitted information, etc.).
Active methods provide tools for verification of the network
operation as a whole, e.g. verification the service packet for-
warding over the network to the sink by sending a specific
content, at the specific time and from specific place.
4.3. MOTHON Prototype Architecture
The prototype system composed of three elements is pre-
sented in Fig. 2. The management application provided
by MS is a console tool is written in C++.
Mobile platform consists of two hardware components:
Lego Mindstorms NTX 2.0 and Raspberry Pi single board
microcomputer. Moreover it is expected, that MP will
be equipped with GPS module or other localization sys-
tem [13], [14].
Fulfilling all the tasks assigned by management application
requires from this platform significantly greater capabilities
in terms of processing power and energy resources. The
key software components of MP are:
• Control module – the main module, responsible for
communication with all other modules and creating
the logic of solution based on information obtained
from the management station.
• Mobility module – responsible for motion trajectory
planning movement and speed calculation.
• Threat analysis module – used for data gathered
from TMSs modules analysis and threat detection.
TMS is implemented over TelosB platform using Con-
tiki OS. Eventually, to complete the system, an automation
process enabling wireless communication between MP an
MS must be added.
5. Conclusion
Starting with a review of threats and security measures
applicable to wireless networks of resource-limited things,
a new approach, introducing mobility as a way of over-
coming the limitations of existing methods has been pre-
sented.
Mobility of a threat detection sensor should improve over-
all security state of monitored networks without any need
to perform their reconfiguration or upgrade. The approach
can be used in existing networks without any modifications
to installed devices. The implementation details, such as
means of mobility, depend on the target network – obvi-
ously a different solution is appropriate inside a building
than in case of a network of oceanic drones.
Various methods of threat detection in MOTHON are cur-
rently under development. In future work authors plan to
conduct experiments in testbed network to show the effec-
tiveness of detection against different kinds of attacks.
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